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Luiza Soulos had worked as a Department of Communities and Justice caseworker since 2017. One of the young people under her responsibility was YP, an Aboriginal boy who was about 14 when they first met. Her work included helping him with food, clothing, medical and Centrelink appointments, and practical day-to-day tasks.
YP died in May 2019, before a planned meeting about his accommodation. Ms Soulos was distressed by his death, took two days away from work and attended five psychologist sessions arranged and paid for by DCJ. She later returned to full duties.
In 2021, DCJ encouraged staff to watch The Department, a documentary about its child-protection work. It was broadcast on SBS on 10 October 2021. The Department had not told Ms Soulos beforehand that a two-minute serious case review panel segment concerned YP’s case.
Neither YP nor Ms Soulos was named in the broadcast. But the segment included discussion of a young person’s suicidal thoughts, remarks that “we really failed this little boy”, and a quotation from what was called one of his suicide notes. Ms Soulos recognised the quotation as an entry in YP’s journal, which she had read after his death.
She said the segment made her feel responsible for YP’s death. She attended work the following day, discussed the documentary with supervisors, and did not return to work. It was common ground that watching the documentary caused a genuine psychiatric injury which totally incapacitated her for work.
The parties conducted the trial in the NSW District Court on the basis that if it was reasonably foreseeable that Ms Soulos might identify YP’s case and might see the panel as blaming her for his death, then psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable.
Judge John Catsanos SC ruled in December 2025 that the Department was liable to Ms Soulos in negligence for her psychiatric injuries.
The Department’s appeal was against the assumptions made at trial, i.e. that it was not reasonably foreseeable that Ms Soulos might identify YP’s case, and might see the panel as blaming her for his death.
On the first question, Justice Richard McHugh – in giving the lead judgment of the appeal court – reasoned that the distinctive journal quotation gave DCJ every reason to expect YP’s caseworker might identify him. After all, other staff had pieced together that the segment concerned YP the day after the broadcast, without any prompting from Ms Soulos .
The Department also contended that the words “we” and “us” referred to the system or senior staff rather than to caseworkers. The appeal judges rejected that argument. The panel’s comments about not listening, not acting and not talking to YP about suicidal thoughts could reasonably be understood as referring to the people responsible for his care, including a caseworker.
The court also rejected the argument that references in the segment to an eight-year-old and to boys aged 10 to 12 meant the criticisms could not have related to Ms Soulos’ time as caseworker. That was because the segment referred to concerns continuing through the report and up to YP’s death. It was therefore reasonably foreseeable that she might see the identified failings as including her period of responsibility.
Ms Soulos knew YP had died from an accidental drug overdose, whereas the documentary segment conveyed an impression of suicide. The court considered that the references to suicide could reinforce her perception that the panel was blaming a caseworker for failing to respond to suicidal thoughts. If she thought the panel was wrong about the manner of death, that could increase her sense of injustice at being blamed.
Was though the the risk of recognisable psychiatric illness was far-fetched or fanciful? That question was answered in the affirmative on the basis that both identification and perceived blame were reasonably foreseeable. The risk of psychiatric injury consequently followed from that result.
Justice Julie Ward noted the “extraordinary” outcome arose from the Department’s concession as to the issue of reasonable foreseeability at trial. The damages verdict – arising as it did from a short documentary segment in which neither the client nor caseworker was publicly identified – was “surprising”.
“Surprising as that outcome may be, in light of the issues the parties chose to litigate and the undemanding test of reasonable foreseeability in the tort of negligence, the appeal must be dismissed”.
Ms Soulos gets to hold the District Court decision in her favour that the Department pay her damages of $1,389,457.74.
Categories: psychological injury